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150 years—and the networked information economy (NIE)—a manyto-many, low-capital, and cooperative model that has been emerging
in the last 15 years. The NIE is built on the infrastructure of the
internet and is characterized by characterized by (1) non-proprietary
strategies, (2) rising non-market production, and (3) more effective,
large-scale cooperative efforts; in other words, “peer production of
information, knowledge, and culture.” These aspects challenge our
economies and our polities, and hold significant promise for
enhancing personal autonomy; however, Benkler, in writing what
amounts to a manifesto for the internet, pays little attention to the
way in which the NIE is vulnerable to technical capture in the same
way the industrial information economy is vulnerable to capital
capture, taking a “wait-and-see” approach to regulatory intervention.
Still, Wealth of Networks is a comprehensive and readable survey of
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I. THE CULTURE WAR
The West is engaged in an escalating culture war. The
battlegrounds are the courts, the legislatures, international
bodies, local communities, and distant countries that
individually may not have much power to affect the outcome
though they do have a vital interest in who wins. The war is
global – and is one that has little to do with gay marriage,
abortion, terrorism, Darwinism, or religion. It is, in one sense, a
war going on above our heads, as it is largely concerned with law
and policy, and society and property. In another sense, it is very
much a war in the trenches, as it affects our ability to choose
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[Wealth of Networks]. An online copy of Yochai Benkler’s book is available
under a Creative Commons Noncommercial Sharealike licence; it can be
accessed through the author’s website at http://www.benkler.org. It will also
be interesting to see what becomes of the wiki “learning and research
environment” centred around the book which, though largely a blank slate at
time of writing, is located at
http://www.benkler.org/wealth_of_networks/index.php/Main_Page.

2

CLPE RESEARCH PAPER SERIES [VOL. 03 NO. 02

how we will live and interact with each other as consumers,
creators, and citizens. Consider the following story:
Diebold is a leading provider of electronic voting machines in
the United States and Brazil. In the 2002 U.S. elections, voting
machines were widely seen as an answer to the problem of
“hanging chads” or imperfectly punctured paper ballots. Public
assurances of the accuracy and security of the machines were
taken at face value by mainstream media – not surprising,
considering the difficulty of analyzing a machine whose
operation is treated as a state secret. Less trusting internet
activists, however, made the investigation of the manufacturer’s
and election officials’ claims a volunteer project. Bev Harris,
who ran her own website, blackboxvoting.com, was able to
obtain and publish the specifications and code for the machines
in 2003, and invited a public review by the computing
community. She later also received a cache of email from a
Diebold whistleblower that showed the code on some of the
machines had been changed after being certified for use in
elections. Diebold threatened litigation under the Digital
Millennium Copyright Act (DCMA). If the company had been
successful in its attempt to have the emails declared copyrighted
or privileged, it might have escaped unscathed. However,
students at various universities had copies of the files and
distributed them using peer-to-peer file-sharing technologies
that are nearly impossible to suppress. Most likely because of
the online discussion, California’s secretary of state set up an
independent investigation and, within a few months, many of
California’s voting machines were decertified.
Yochai Benkler, who reports this and other stories in his erudite
and expansive book The Wealth of Networks: How Social
Production Transforms Markets and Freedoms, says we are in
“a battle, in the domain of law and policy, over the shape of the
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social settlement that will emerge around the digital
computation and communications revolution.”2 What do voting
machines have to do with computers and communication? They
are part of a new economy – a networked economy – centred
around information and structured by rules of ownership for
intellectual outputs. The question is whether this economy will
be mostly proprietary and tightly controlled by corporate
interests or if it will give meaningful space to non-market social
production? The answer to that question has significant
implications for individual freedom, the public sphere, and the
shape of our future economy.

II. THE NETWORKED INFORMATION ECONOMY
The parties in Benkler’s book are divided into two camps, the
industrial information economy—a one-way, capital-intensive,
and professionally-produced model that has held sway for 150
years—and the networked information economy (NIE)—a manyto-many, low-capital, and cooperative model that has been
emerging in the last 15 years. Newspapers, record companies,
and broadcasters are members of the former; bloggers, file
sharers, and decentralized programmers and encyclopedia
writers are members of the latter. The infrastructure that the
NIE shares is, of course, the internet, which Benkler describes as
“a communications environment built on cheap processors with
high computational capabilities, interconnected in a pervasive
network.”3 This environment is characterized by (1) nonproprietary strategies, (2) rising non-market production, and (3)
more effective, large-scale cooperative efforts; in other words,
“peer production of information, knowledge, and culture.”4
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Benkler identifies the third feature as the most revolutionary
because it challenges both our economics and our politics.

A. THE ECONOMIC CHALLENGE
Benkler sees peer production as an inversion of the conditions
Ronald Coase explored in his investigation of the relationship
between the market and the firm.5 Coase pointed out that firms,
while they compete against other firms according to the rules of
the market, are not themselves organized according to market
principles. Markets are organized largely by the price system.
Producers flock to high prices, consumers to low prices. Inside
the firm, however, production and consumption are organized
by managerial fiat. Workers have significantly less freedom
within the firm to contract for their services than the firm has
within the market to contract for its products or expertise.
Coase argues that firms exist because certain transactions are
easier and cheaper to organize within a command hierarchy than
within a market. A firm will grow so long as its management
can rearrange “the factors of production under its control”6 to
outweigh the benefit of trading those factors on the open
market.
Benkler, in an argument developed in “Coase’s Penguin, or,
Linux and The Nature of the Firm,”7 says that markets and firms
are two different ways of solving the problem of information:
how does one identify the best person for the job? Markets
depend on price signals; firms depend on managerial discretion.
Under a third option—one he calls “commons-based peer
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Ronald H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386 (1937).
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Ibid. at 405.
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112 Yale L.J. 369 (2002). The article is available online under a Creative
Commons Attribution-Noncommercial Sharealike licence at
http://www.yale.edu/yalelj/112/BenklerWEB.pdf.
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production”8—the best individuals, working on a neutral
network, self-identify and self-select for a given project. This
option works best for projects with high levels of “granularity;”
that is, projects which can be broken down into many small
component parts, such as classifying craters on Mars (NASA
Clickworkers), writing encyclopedias (Wikipedia), and even
building online worlds (Second Life, a massive multi-player
online game). Peer production has a big advantage over markets
and firms: transaction costs are reduced essentially to zero
(achieving ideal efficiency) so long as the group is large enough
to aggregate resources and conduct peer review, and so long as
each person has equal access to an informational network.
Up until now, access to the informational network – the
internet – has been near-neutral with respect to both the person
using it and the data that the person is passing back and forth.
The internet operates much like a public highway, in that it is
indifferent to the person and his or her destination, as well as
the type of data he or she is transmitting. However, the
concentration of business and media that has occurred within
the industrial information economy is being echoed in the basic
infrastructure of the NIE – most people obtain high-speed
internet access from either their cable or telephone provider.
Moreover, new router technology allows internet providers to
distinguish traffic between a subscriber and “undesirable” sites
(e.g. a competitor’s or non-rent-paying site) and traffic between a
subscriber and “good” sites (e.g. those of advertising partners)
and vary the speed of access accordingly. Government
regulations support this discrimination. Broadband internet
access has been regarded in the United States since the Brand X
case9 last year as an information “service” rather than a
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National Cable & Telecommunications Assn. v. Brand X Internet Services,
545 U.S. 277 at 281 (2005).
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telecommunications infrastructure, relieving cable and
telephone carriers from the regulatory requirement to permit
competition from other broadband service providers. Without
significant pushback from citizens and businesses, the effect of
these trends will be to needlessly destroy or, at least, inhibit the
growth of a promising new arena for economic production.

B. THE POLITICAL CHALLENGE
The same characteristics that make peer production good at
solving large-scale collective action problems in business may
also make it better at resolving failures of participatory
democracy in complex liberal societies than mass media. At
root, Benkler argues, the public sphere, where political
understandings are hammered out, is not linked to a particular
forum but is rather a process of communication between
citizens. He draws on Habermas’ definition of the public sphere
as
“…a network for communicating information and
points of view (i.e., opinions expressing affirmative or
negative attitudes);” which, in the process of
communicating this information and these points of
view, filters and synthesizes them “in such a way that
they coalesce into bundles of topically specified public
opinions.”10
In liberal societies, this public sphere is (supposed to be) free of
governmental coercion. The mass media have traditionally been
understood to constitute those fora that take in various
opinions, filter them, and synthesize them into “something
more than private opinions held by some number of

10

Supra, note 1 at 181.
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individuals.”11 The media are good at this task because they are
independent from government and professional researchers, and
are almost universal in their reach. The high level of investment
required to be in the media business (for printing presses,
television studios, etc.), however, has made the media
vulnerable to three criticisms that Benkler lists: first, their
intake is extremely limited; second, concentration for business
reasons has put the filtration of public opinion into the hands of
a very few; and, third, dependence on advertising for cash flow
pushes the media away from all but the most caricatured of
provocative political discourse.12
Peer production in the NIE can ameliorate these weaknesses. In
the first place, intake is universal. No barriers (other than lack
of a minimum level computer literacy) prevent an individual
from, for example, setting up a blog. Second, recent research has
shown that the structure of the internet tends to use social
filtration and accreditation to resolve potential problems of
information overload and fragmentation. Instead of the
cacophony of everyone being heard equally, reader attention
patterns and the process of “linking” harmonize individual
thoughts into larger movements of opinion. The blog, which
features short posts, intense dialogue, and extensive mutual
linking, is an especially powerful tool for constructing opinions
within a given community as well as building consensus or at
least carrying on conversations across political lines. The rising
influence of blogs has been noted in political campaigns
(Howard Dean’s Democratic leadership bid) and mass media
reporters now routinely canvass the more influential blogs when
attempting to gauge the mood of the public. Finally, there are no
costs incurred in communicating with a broad audience, so
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individuals do not have to tone down their statements merely
for the sake of preserving their cash flow.
The internet is not likely to replace mass media, nor should it
be seen necessarily as a threat to mass media’s existence.
However, because the internet is more decentralized and less
prone to capture by high-rolling owners and advertisers, it can
give a stronger voice to marginal political groups and even serve
as a watchdog over the watchdog, as was shown in the story of
the Diebold voting machines.
Benkler emphasizes that these virtual associations are forming
spontaneously, and that their emergence is not due to laws or
marketing, but rather is a function of the internet’s architecture
and our basic human need to relate to one another. The public
sphere precedes politics. Benkler does not argue that the state
has no regulatory role, but only that it should take a “wait and
see” approach to policy-making. It is too early to measure the
potential of the NIE as a space for collective social action and,
therefore, too early to impose laws that might privilege actors
from the old industrial information economy. While
governments could be investing in common, neutral network
infrastructures that would allow new institutional spaces to
form, Benkler mostly dismisses their “well-intentioned but
wrongheaded efforts to optimize the institutional ecology for
outdated modes of information and cultural production.”13
Benkler says “… there is more freedom to be found through
opening up institutional spaces for voluntary individual and
cooperative action than there is in intentional public action
through the state.”14 Unfortunately, governments on both sides
of the Atlantic are using the ratcheting rhetoric of competitive
advantage and “harmonization” to close off institutional spaces

13

Ibid. at 21.

14

Ibid. at 22.
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in favour of economic interests. The European Union is even
creating quasi-property rights in raw data under the Database
Directive!

III. PRESERVING AUTONOMY
The benefits of the NIE to democracy are more basic than its
power to enhance conversation within the public sphere. One of
the foundational aspects of a liberal society is its regard for
individual autonomy. The NIE and its peer production culture
aims to enhance this autonomy by reconceptualizing the
individual as a “user” rather than simply a “producer” or
“consumer.” The user is a
new category of relationship to information
production and exchange. Users are individuals who
are sometimes consumers and sometimes producers …
the networked information economy promises to
enrich individual autonomy substantively by creating
an environment built less around control and more
around facilitating action.15 [Emphasis mine.]
The problem, says Benkler, is that we more often see the law’s
effect on autonomy in formal terms rather than according to
substantive outcomes. This is not entirely negative: trying to
achieve outcomes through law can sometimes undermine the
very autonomy we are trying to cultivate. However, given that
law is a source of constraint, Benkler argues that we must look
beyond laws that directly limit autonomy to “laws that
structure the conditions of action for individuals living within
the ambit of their effect.”16 In other words, our laws are already
affecting outcomes – if we want our democracy and culture to

15

Ibd. at 138.
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Ibid. at 142.
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prosper, we should know what those outcomes are, and whether
they are desirable.
For example, Lawrence Lessig, in his book Free Culture,17
criticizes the dramatic expansion in both the term and the scope
of copyright that has occurred in the last fifty years. Not only
have automatic copyright terms of 95 years – instituted in the
1970s – prevented most of the cultural products of the twentieth
century from entering the public domain, the notion of
“property is good, more property is better”18 that Benkler
attributes to judges and legislators has effectively turned the
concept of “limited copyright” found in the U.S. Constitution
into a regime of zero right to copy.
Lessig’s description is supported by Benkler’s discussion of the
case of Bridgeport Music, Inc.,19 where the court held that “any
digital sampling, no matter how trivial [in this case, two
seconds], could be the basis of a copyright suit.”20 Telling our
artists, in the name of “intellectual property,” that they must be
completely original in order to produce anything of artistic value
restricts them (and thereby us) from criticizing, glamorizing,
spoofing, and learning from our shared cultural history.
Decisions such as Bridgeport Music have a chilling effect, not
only on the creation of rap music, but also on the ability of
anyone but the largest studios to immunize themselves against
lawsuits (e.g. by obtaining insurance), even when an artist’s

17

Lawrence Lessig, Free Culture: The Nature and Future of Creativity (New
York: Penguin, 2004). A copy of the book is available online under a Creative
Commons Attribution-Noncommercial Licence at http://freeculture.cc/freecontent/.
18

Supra, note 1 at 319.

19

Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Dimension Films, 383 F.3d 390 (6th Cir. 2004)
[Bridgeport Music].
20

Supra, note 1 at 444.
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inclusion of copyrighted material falls under “fair use”
guidelines.
Intellectual property was created by law to encourage artists to
devote themselves to their work, knowing that they would be
able to reap the initial rewards. Lawmakers have lost sight of
this autonomy-enhancing goal, and have interpreted intellectual
property laws in ways that demean the individual, turning him
or her into a passive consumer of mass-produced culture.
Benkler points out two ways that information law can encroach
on personal autonomy: first, it can increase the “relative
capacity of some people systematically to constrain the
perceptions or shape the preferences of others”21 and, second, it
can “reduce significantly the range and variety of options open
to people in society generally, or to certain classes of people.”22
The failure that Benkler identifies—that is, the failure of
supposedly
liberal
institutions
to
recognize
the
counterproductive outcomes of its laws—demonstrates one of
the weaknesses of bare liberalism itself, which is its inability to
see the cultural structures that stand between the individual and
the state, and how the laws of the state reinforce certain cultural
choices and groups to the exclusion of others. When bare
liberalism encounters cultural change, even if that change is
positive and flourishing, its political and legal institutions
flounder. The weaknesses are exacerbated when powerful and
well-funded interests, such as the Hollywood lobby or the
recording industry (which, as Benkler points out, is not an
artistic vehicle so much as a distribution channel – and an
inefficient one when compared to peer-to-peer networks23), are

21

Ibid. at 149.

22

Ibid. at 150.
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Ibid. at 427.
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able to gain influence and then use it to squelch competition or
turn millions of people into so-called criminals for violating
regressive copyright laws.

IV. VULNERABILITIES OF THE NIE
The strength of a given architecture is often its weakness as
well. Democracy builds governmental legitimacy through the
electoral system, but voter apathy can result in a cycle of
worsening representation that ultimately undermines the
legitimacy elections were created to instil. The industrial
information economy excels at reaching large audiences;
however, it may be captured by a well-capitalized media
oligarchy. Benkler, in writing what is at heart a manifesto for
the internet (though philosophically deeper than the cheeky
Cluetrain Manifesto24 and less obviously idealistic than the IFLA
Manifesto25), doesn’t pay much attention to the way in which
the NIE is vulnerable to technical capture in the same way the
industrial information economy is vulnerable to capital capture.
In the NIE, the potential capture point is at the filtration stage.
There are only a few search engines that filter most of the
information on the internet – Google being the best known
among them – and the top tools are provided by corporations
using proprietary algorithms. Google’s willingness to collaborate
with the Chinese government in filtering out “destabilizing”

24

The Cluetrain Manifesto can be found online at
http://cluetrain.com/#manifesto. The manifesto was largely aimed at
corporations trying to leverage the vast internet audience, and its central
message is “We are not seats or eyeballs or end users or consumers. We are
human beings – and our reach exceeds your grasp. Deal with it.”

25

The IFLA Manifesto (http://www.ifla.org/III/misc/im-e.htm) is a paean to
the right to freedom of expression and opinion found in Article 19 of the U.N.
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, stating that “[internet] access should
neither be subject to any form of ideological, political or religious censorship,
nor to economic barriers.”
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information for the sake of market advantage is troubling to say
the least. As Benkler himself states,
A fundamental requirement of self-direction is the
capacity to perceive the state of the world, to conceive
of available options for action, to connect actions to
consequences, to evaluate alternative outcomes, and
to decide upon and pursue an action accordingly.26
Yet if potential perceptions are filtered out before they ever get
to the screen, if prospective “users” never discovers what
actions are available to them, how much use is universal intake
of opinion, or even the most efficient accreditation and review
structures?
Benkler provides strong ammunition against the assault on the
NIE by the old industrial information economy, vigorously
defending the internet’s right to exist as it is in the face of the
self-preservation tactics employed by industries fearing
significant losses as a result of the growing popularity of filesharing. Benkler’s support for “municipal funding of open access
broadband networks, state funding of basic research, and
possible strategic regulatory interventions to negate monopoly
control over essential resources in the digital environment”27
better addresses economic and social conditions than the handsoff legal framework that Lessig advocates. In Benkler’s view, the
trouble is that the policy driving present regulatory
interventions is wrongly framed in
… local specific terms. We ask questions like, Will
this policy optimize ‘spectrum management’ in these
frequencies, or, Will this decrease the number of CDs

26

Supra, note 1 at 146.

27

Ibid. at 21.
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sold? However, the basic, overarching question that
we must learn to ask in all these debates is: Are we
leaving enough institutional space for the socialeconomic practices of networked information
28
production to emerge?
Benkler’s book is a comprehensive but readable survey of the
policy choices we must make if we are to allow the NIE to
flourish (and he clearly signals which parts of the book are of
particular interest to the technical illuminati). Wealth of
Networks is a worthwhile outward- and forward-looking
manifesto for an information infrastructure that has come of
age. At the same time, internet advocates would do well to take
Benkler’s lessons in the history of the industrial information
economy to heart, and to work hard to fulfil his vision of a true
commons-based and non-proprietary ecology within the
networked information economy.

28

Ibid. at 393.

